²Quoted in Lindgren, K., Mason, H. and Gordon, B. The Corporation and Australian Society. Law Book Company, Sydney, 1974, v.

³Stone, C. Op. cit. xii.

⁴For a concise account of the fundamentals of liberalism see Bottomley, S., Gunningham, N. and Parker, S. Law In Context. Federation Press, Leichhardt, 1991, ch.2.

⁵See Posner, R. "Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory" (1979) 8 J Leg Stud 103.

6Kant, I. Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals. Paton, H. (trans.), Harper & Row, New York, 1964, 95. Emphasis in original.

⁷Regan, T. The Case for Animal Rights. University of California Press, Berkely, 1983.

⁸Kymlicka, W. Liberalism, Community and Culture. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.

⁹See Collins, H. "Political Ideology in Australia: The Distinctiveness of a Benthamite Society" in Graubard, S. (ed). Australia: The Daedalus Symposium. Angus & Robertson, 1985, 147.

¹⁰Bentham is well known for having expostulated, "Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, - nonsense upon stilts." (Bentham, J. "Anarchical Fallacies" in Melden, A. (ed). Human Rights. Wadsworth, Belmont, 1970, 28, 32. Emphasis in original.)

¹¹Mackie, J. "Can There Be a Right-Based Moral Theory?" in Waldron, J. (ed.) Theories of Rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, 168, 171.

¹²Of course, the distinction is not so clear as the preceding statement suggests. Critical legal scholars would suggest that questions of law are themselves subjective and political. As suggested above, however, this is not a "critical" paper. It is my assumption that the process of legal interpretation is for practical purposes comparatively determinate, and political only in a limited sense: see Posner, R. "The Jurisprudence of Skepticism" (1988) 86 Mich L Rev 827, esp. 837-858.

¹³Bill of Rights 1990 (NZ) s.29.