2First National Bank v Bellotti (1978) 435 US 765, 55 L Ed 2d 707, 778 (US) per Powell J, characterising the stated view as "extreme".
3Stokes, M. Op. cit. 162.
4Rand, A. The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism. New American Library, New York, 1963, 102.
5Stokes, M. Op. cit. 164.
6This view has also been termed an "organicist", "real person", "real entity", "group person" and "corporatist" theory: see Mark, G. "The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law" (1987) 54 Uni Chi L Rev 1441, 1464-1478; Stokes, M. Op. cit. 163, 177.
7Stokes, M. Op. cit. 163.
8Mark, G. Op. cit. 1472.
9Note. "Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person" (1982) 91 Yale LJ 1641, 1650 n.38, and cf. Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150.
10Eg. Mark, G. Op. cit.; Note. Op. cit.
11Woytash, J. "We Must Stop Viewing Corporations as People" (1978) 64 ABAJ 814.
12Dan-Cohen, M. Rights, Persons, and Organizations. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1986, 5.
13Bedeian, A. and Zamnuto, R. Organizations: Theory and Design. Dryden, Chicago, 1991, 9.
14Dan-Cohen, M. Op. cit., 31.
15Ibid. 49.
16Ibid. 46-49.
17Dan-Cohen devotes approximately one page to it: ibid. 61-2.
18Ibid. 49.
19Dan-Cohen admits at p.50 that "unlike the corporation described in ... our story, real-life corporations do contain individuals in various roles and positions."
20See Stewart, B. Book Review of Rights, Persons and Organizations (1987) 101 Harv LR 371, 378-380 for a summary of four perspectives from the organisation theory literature which Dan-Cohen's definition neglects.
21Ruben, D. "The Existence of Social Entities" (1982) 32 Philosophical Quarterly 295.
22Daft, R. Organization Theory and Design. 4th ed., West Publishing Co., St Paul, 1992, 10.
23Cited in Dewey, J. "The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality" (1926) 35 Yale LJ 655, 673.
24McDonald, M. "Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal Individualism" (1991) 4 Can J of Law & Juris 217, 219.
25This is not to be confused with the usage of that term in the Corporations Law to refer to a corporation's shareholders or guarantors.
26Ewick, P. "In the Belly of the Beast: Rethinking Rights, Persons and Organisations" (1988) 13 Law & Soc Inq 175, 179.
27Cyert, R. and March, J. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1963, 27.
28See Fisse, B. and Braithwaite, J. Corporations, Crime and Accountability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, 26-27.
29Corporations Law s.221(1).
30Corporations Law s.221(2).
31However there may be arguments beyond the scope of this paper which support the rights of non-organisational corporations. One possible argument for the rights of corporations with only one active member might rely on the discontinuity between that member's private and corporate self. This discontinuity is a function of the detachment (or "role distance") with which members of corporations tend to enact their organisational roles (see Dan-Cohen, M. "Freedom of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State" (1991) 79 Calif L Rev 1229, 1237-8). Since the member's corporate self is essentially represented by the corporation, it may be argued that it ought to be able to claim those rights which inhere in the member in the enactment of his or her corporate role. However this argument is of a different type to those with which I am concerned. To claim that corporations should have rights because of the rights possessed by their members (whether in their corporate or private roles) is to argue for "derivative" rights of corporations. This paper is concerned with corporations' "original" rights. This distinction is explained in part 3.3 of chapter 2.
32See Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch 323, reversed by Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22.