²See Dan-Cohen, M. Op. cit. (1986) 64-69.

³Fisse, B. Book Review of Rights, Persons and Organizations (1987) 10 UNSWLJ 295, 299.

⁴See Kahn, R., Wolfe, P., Quinn, R., Snoek, D. and Rosenthal, R. Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity. Wiley, New York, 1964.

⁵This is not to say that this is necessarily a degrading process. McDonald notes:

an organization can be expressive of the people in it in the way that ... a dance can be expressive of its dancers. Now the price of this ... [is] masking the dancers' personality. ... It would be perverse to see this as undermining and threatening the self ....

6For example, Marcuse, H. One-Dimensional Man. Sphere Books, London, 1968.

7This is not intended to imply that a corporation's rights are merely a device to collect the value of the individual autonomy foregone by its members (although this may be a good argument for corporate utility rights). The individual autonomy foregone by the members of a corporation is more of a pointer to than a measure of the value corporate autonomy has to them as a whole.

⁸Hartney, M. "Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights" (1991) 4 Can J of Law & Juris 293, 308.

⁹Ibid. 304.

¹⁰Note that these need not be interests in autonomy, and thus capable of supporting individual autonomy rights. Indeed, it is unlikely that interests in the autonomy of a collectivity could be framed as individual autonomy rights, since liberals assume that individuals can be constituted as fully autonomous beings without needing to interact with groups. On this assumption a collectivity's right to autonomy could only be a utility right, designed to further the utility of its members.

¹¹Réaume, D. "Individuals, Groups and Rights to Public Goods" (1988) 38 Uni Toronto L Rev 1, 10.

¹²Ibid. 23.

¹³Ibid. 11.

¹⁴See footnote .

¹⁵Stewart, B. Op. cit. 381.

¹⁶Mills v Mills, op. cit.

¹⁷Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd. [1951] Ch 286, 291 per Evershed MR.

¹⁸See eg. Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd. (in liq.) (1986) 4 NSWLR 722.

¹⁹Cf. Stokes, M. Op. cit. 177.

²⁰Where the directors are displaced from their position as the legal representatives of the corporation, there seems to be no reason why those who replace them (eg. liquidators or administrators) should not also take on the responsibility of protecting the corporation's rights. These parties are likely to be better placed than the directors to fulfil this responsibility while they have control of the company.

²¹Note. Op. cit. 1641.

²²Hartney, M. Op. cit. 300.

²³Ibid. 308.

²⁴Indeed, the corporation's representatives should have a duty not to do so: see part 2.2 of this chapter.

²⁵Woytash, J. Op. cit.

²⁶See Cyert, R. and March, J. Op. cit.

²⁷Thompson, A. Jr. and Strickland, A. III. Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases. 6th ed., Irwin, Homewood, 1992, 255.

²⁸See Parke v Daily News Ltd. [1962] Ch 927.

²⁹The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance provide in [[section]]2.01:

(b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain is not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business: ... (2) May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; and (3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational and philanthropic purposes.

³⁰Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward (1819) 17 US 518, 4 L Ed 514.

³¹Stewart, B. Op. cit. 381.

³²Nino, C. "The Communitarian Challenge to Liberal Rights" (1989) 8 Law & Phil 37, 48.

³³Raz has suggested otherwise, but his view of a collective right is that it "rests on the cumulative interests of many individuals." (Raz, J. "Right-Based Moralities" in Waldron, J. (ed). Theories of Rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, 182, 194, n.13.)

³⁴Réaume, D. Op. cit. 26.

³⁵Ibid.